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A BEE LINE IN THE WRONG DIRECTION: 
SCIENCE, TEENAGERS, AND THE STING 
TO “THE AGE OF CONSENT” 
Jennifer Ann Drobac* 
Most New Yorkers may not know that a 1933 New York 
case and its precedential line effectively erase “the age of 
consent” for New York civil cases. In that case, Barton v. Bee 
Line, Inc., the New York Supreme Court held that fifteen-year-
old Grace Barton, who allegedly consented to sex with a male 
bus driver, could not recover in a civil case for damages brought 
by Frank Barton, her guardian ad litem.1 The court arrived at 
this conclusion even though New York had outlawed sex with a 
female under eighteen years old and barred all minors from 
bringing direct suits. The jury had found for Grace in the 
amount of $3,000 (about $50,500 today).2 However, “[t]he court 
                                                          
* Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley Law—Center for the Study of Law & 
Society and Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. I thank Professors Lois Weithorn and R. George Wright, 
Martin Drobac, Esq., Dr. Todd Preuss, and Michal McDowell who reviewed 
and commented upon early drafts of this Article or draft materials used 
herein. I also thank Miriam Murphy, Associate Director, Ruth Lilly Law 
Library, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
1 Barton v. Bee Line, Inc., 265 N.Y.S. 284, 284–86 (App. Div. 1933). 
This case is a classic “he said, she said” case. Grace Barton claimed forcible 
rape and the driver claimed that she consented to sex. This Article 
acknowledges the continuing problematic nature of credibility determinations 
in alleged rape cases and the bias against complaining women who sue for 
civil damages. I will address this particular bias more directly in another 
article. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Abandoning Teenage Consent for Legal 
Assent: Harmonizing Developmental Sciences and the Law (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
2 Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a 
U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present, MEASURING WORTH, http://www. 
measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (enter 1933 as the initial year, 3000 as the 
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set the verdict aside on the ground that, if plaintiff consented, 
the verdict was excessive . . . .”3 The appellate court ruled that 
Grace could not recover civilly even though her seducer was 
criminally prosecuted “to protect the virtue of females and to 
save society from the ills of promiscuous intercourse.”4 The 
court reasoned, “It is one thing to say that society will protect 
itself by punishing those who consort with females under the age 
of consent; it is another to hold that, knowing the nature of her 
act, such female shall be rewarded for her indiscretion.”5 The 
court added: 
The very object of the statute will be frustrated if by a 
material return for her fall “we should unwarily put it in 
the power of the female sex to become seducers in their 
turn.” Instead of incapacity to consent being a shield to 
save, it might be a sword to desecrate.6 
Desecrate what? A society that righteously protects only 
“virtuous” (but still incapacitated) girls? The court’s opinion 
highlights its disapproval of possibly sexually active, 
“promiscuous” young women. It also heralded the end of the 
“age of consent” for civil cases in New York.7 
This civil law evisceration of “the age of consent” is not 
unique to New York. One can trace similar patterns across the 
nation, particularly in Illinois and California.8 The Bee Line 
case, juxtaposed against the new neuroscience and psychosocial 
                                                          
initial amount, and 2011 as the desired year; then follow “Calculate” 
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
3 Bee Line, 265 N.Y.S. at 284. 
4 Id. at 285. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (quoting Smith v. Richards, 29 Conn. 232, 240 (1860)). 
7 The “age of consent” commonly refers to the age at which a minor 
(someone under eighteen years old) may legally consent to engage in sexual 
activity with an adult and, thereby, insulate that adult from criminal 
prosecution. But see Donaldson v. Dep’t of Real Estate, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
577, 588–89 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing that “the age of consent” may refer 
to the age a minor can legally consent to marry). 
8 See, e.g., Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 
2009 WL 5183773, at *2, *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (granting in part 
and denying in part motions for summary judgment). 
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evidence of adolescent development, resurrects the question of 
whether a minor should be allowed to recover civilly for alleged 
damages following a violation of criminal law. This Article 
explores whether minors have the developmental maturity 
consistent with an assignment of full adult legal capacity. It also 
questions whether adolescent “consent”9 should insulate alleged 
tortfeasors from liability. Are we, as a society, taking a Bee 
Line in the wrong direction? 
This Article answers that question in the affirmative. It 
proposes that New York and sister states adopt a new stance in 
response to adolescent consent to sex with an adult. In 
particular, it offers the notion of legal assent, a mechanism that 
presumes no threshold legal capacity but affords teenagers 
autonomous decision making authority and protection following 
misguided decisions. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the 
neuroscience and psychosocial evidence regarding adolescent 
development to maturity. This research is new and reported 
conclusions vary, but a snapshot review of current understanding 
helps guide an evaluation of law first formulated in 1933. Part I 
concludes that adolescents are not younger, smaller adults but 
are fundamentally different in the ways they think and behave. 
Part II explores legal guidance concerning consent, assent, and 
juvenile incapacity. It highlights that legal authority cautions 
against attributing full legal capacity to minors—whether or not 
one affords them decision making autonomy. Part III reviews 
recent cases from New York to show how New York courts 
treat adolescent consent to unlawful sex with an adult 
inconsistently. It also notes several other cases from across the 
nation that replicate the New York inconsistencies. This Article 
concludes in Part IV by recommending a new approach to 
adolescent consent to sex with an adult—legal assent. 
                                                          
9 I use quotations with adolescent “consent” because even explicit verbal 
agreement by a minor may not constitute legal consent and may equate more 
realistically with acquiescence. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 68 (1986) (holding that acquiescence is not consent in an evaluation of 
the unwelcomeness of sexual conduct under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). 
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I. ADOLESCENT NEUROLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT10 
While no set biological markers precisely define the 
beginning and end of adolescence as a stage of human 
development, most researchers agree that it occurs during the 
second decade of life.11 Increasingly, scientists argue that 
adolescence (or “emerging adulthood”) extends to about age 
twenty-five.12 Adolescents experience physical, cognitive, sexual, 
and psychosocial development during this long maturation 
phase.13 The survey of changes discussed below indicates that 
transitional adolescent functioning differs significantly from adult 
behavior. 
A. Neurological Development 
In 1999, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
announced that the adolescent brain undergoes dramatic changes 
not before understood.14 Dr. Jay Giedd, a NIMH neuroscientist, 
                                                          
10 For a thorough, detailed and updated discussion of the neurological 
and psychosocial development of teenagers, see JENNIFER ANN DROBAC, 
WORLDLY BUT NOT YET WISE (Univ. of Chi. Press, under contract); see also 
Jennifer Ann Drobac, Consent, Teenagers, and (Un)Civil(ized) 
Consequences, in CHILDREN, SEX AND THE LAW (Ellen Marrus & Sacha 
Coupet eds., forthcoming 2012); Jennifer Ann Drobac, I Can’t to I Kant: The 
Sexual Harassment of Working Adolescents, Competing Theories, and Ethical 
Dilemmas, 70 ALB. L. REV. 675, 713–17 (2007). See generally Jennifer Ann 
Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law and 
in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1 (2006) 
(discussing new neuroscientific and psychosocial evidence regarding 
adolescent physical and psychosocial development). 
11 See, e.g., LINDA PATIA SPEAR, THE BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE OF 
ADOLESCENCE 5 (2010). 
12 Id. (citing JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE 
WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE EARLY TWENTIES 
(2004)). 
13 See generally id. at 36–190. 
14 NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, NIH PUBLICATION NO. 01-4929, 
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examined adolescent brains using advanced imaging 
technology.15 He discovered that, over the span of a year, gray 
matter almost doubles in some brain sectors, including the 
prefrontal cortex.16 An important element of the central nervous 
system, the gray matter consists of cells and neuron connections, 
synapses, which enable high cognitive functioning.17 Depending 
upon the brain sector, non-linear increases in gray matter peak 
between ages eleven and sixteen for girls and about a year later, 
respectively, for boys. Following the growth period, the body 
purges connections not required and reorganizes the functioning 
of the brain.18 Scientists knew that such growth and 
reorganization phases occur during gestation and the first 
eighteen months after birth. They did not know about this 
second wave of overproduction and winnowing that occurs 
throughout puberty.19 
The dramatic changes that occur during puberty influence 
adolescent reasoning and the ability to formulate consent because 
of the functions of the particular areas of the brain involved.20 
Neuroscientist Dr. Elizabeth Sowell and her colleagues explain, 
“Neuropsychological studies show that the frontal lobes are 
                                                          
TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS (2001) [hereinafter NIMH, Teenage 
Brain], available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/bhhf/scienceonourminds/NIMH 
%20PDFs/04%20Teenage.pdf. 
15 Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and 
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 
861–63 (1999). 
16 Paul M. Thompson et al., Growth Patterns in the Developing Brain 
Detected by Using Continuum Mechanical Tensor Maps, 404 NATURE 190, 
192 (2000). 
17 NIMH, Teenage Brain, supra note 14. See generally Judith L. 
Rapoport et al., Progressive Cortical Change During Adolescence in 
Childhood-Onset Schizophrenia: A Longitudinal Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Study, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 649 (1999) (finding that study 
patients with early-onset schizophrenia have a significant decrease in cortical 
gray matter during adolescence, suggesting that the gray matter helps enable 
high cognitive functioning). 
18 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 81–83. 
19 Interview: Jay Giedd, Inside the Teenage Brain, PBS FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Interview: Jay Giedd]. 
20 See id. 
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essential for such functions as response inhibition, emotional 
regulation, planning and organization. Many of these aptitudes 
continue to develop between adolescence and young 
adulthood.”21 The more mature the frontal cortex, “the area of 
sober second thought,” the better teenagers can reason, control 
their impulses, and make considered judgments. “Thus, there is 
fairly widespread agreement that adolescents take more risks at 
least partly because they have an immature frontal cortex, 
because this is the area of the brain that takes a second look at 
something and reasons about a particular behavior.”22 This 
understanding has serious implications regarding adolescent 
consent and legal capacity. 
Other areas of the brain also influence teen judgment and 
behavior. Similar to the frontal cortex, the cerebellum matures 
well into adolescence.23 Dr. Giedd believes that the cerebellum 
enhances functioning in all forms of higher thought, from 
mathematics to decision making and social skill.24 The corpus 
callosum connects the two hemispheres of the brain and appears 
to influence creativity and problem solving.25 A primitive area of 
the brain, the amygdala, likely governs emotional and “gut” 
responses during adolescence. While adults rely primarily on the 
frontal cortex when interpreting emotional information, 
                                                          
21 Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain 
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 
860 (1999). 
22 Sarah Spinks, Adolescent Brains Are Works in Progress, Inside the 
Teenage Brain, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/teenbrain/work/adolescent.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter Spinks, Works in Progress] (focusing on Dr. Giedd’s research). 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see also Interview: Jay Giedd, supra note 19. Dr. Geidd notes that 
the cerebellum, “involved in coordination of our cognitive process, our 
thinking processes[,]” does not finish changing until the 20s. He adds that 
“this ability to smooth out all the different intellectual processes to navigate 
the complicated social life of the teen . . . seems to be a function of the 
cerebellum.” Id. Dr. Todd Preuss commented here that Dr. Giedd’s view on 
the cerebellum is one not widely held by neuroscientists but one “held by a 
respected minority.” Id. 
25 Interview: Jay Giedd, supra note 19. 
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adolescents tend to use the amygdala.26 Some scientists 
hypothesize that the use of the amygdala rather than the frontal 
cortex explains why teenagers experience trouble regulating their 
emotional responses.27 
The pruning and organization of the new neural connections 
in the brain continue throughout the teen years. Giedd asserts, 
“Maturation does not stop at age 10, but continues into the teen 
years and even the 20s.”28 The mechanism of synaptic pruning is 
not yet well understood. One might think that more gray matter 
means higher functioning. Not so, says Giedd. “Bigger isn’t 
necessarily better, or else the peak in brain function would occur 
at age 11 or 12 . . . . The advances come from actually [the] 
taking away and pruning down of certain connections 
themselves.”29 Drawing conclusions from the research, some 
scientists suggest that the pruning occurs on a “‘use it or lose it’ 
principle,” such that used connections survive.30 Unused 
                                                          
26 Sarah Spinks, One Reason Teens Respond Differently to the World: 
Immature Brain Circuitry, Inside the Teenage Brain, PBS FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/onereason.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (discussing Deborah Yurgelun-Todd’s study); 
see also Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Inside the Teenage Brain, PBS 
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/intervi 
ews/todd.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (noting that Yurgelun-Todd’s 
results are from a very small pilot study, and that caution should be used in 
the interpretation of the results). See generally Abigail A. Baird et al., 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in 
Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 195 (1999) (discussing Deborah Yurgelun-Todd’s study). 
27 Sowell, supra note 21, at 860. 
28 Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 27, 
2000, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2000/02/27/getting-inside-a-
teen-brain.html (quoting Dr. Jay Giedd). 
29 Interview: Jay Giedd, supra note 19. 
30 Spinks, Works in Progress, supra note 22. Some researchers caution 
against premature conclusions based on early scientific findings. See, e.g., 
Monica A. Payne, “Use-It-or-Lose-It”? Interrogating an Educational 
Message from Teen Brain Research, 35 AUSTRALIAN J. TCHR. EDUC., no. 5, 
2010 at 79. In particular, Dr. Elizabeth Sowell commented, “‘Jay likes to say 
“use it or lose it” and that we should put kids in enriched environments. That 
makes perfect intuitive sense, but we just don’t have the data to say that.’” 
Kendall Powell, How Does the Teenage Brain Work?, 442 NATURE 865, 866 
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connections “wither and die.”31 “If a teen is doing music or 
sports or academics, those are the cells and connections that will 
be hardwired. If [he or she is] lying on the couch or playing 
videogames or MTV, those are the cells and connections that are 
going to survive.”32 
During the gray matter pruning phase, white matter 
increases. The white matter supports neural connections in the 
brain.33 “A layer of insulation called myelin progressively 
envelops these nerve fibers, making them more efficient, just 
like insulation on electric wires improves their conductivity.”34 
More recently, scientists discovered that myelin also “modulates 
the timing and synchrony of the neuronal firing patterns that 
create functional networks in the brain.”35 Evidence indicates 
that environmental experiences influence myelination.36 
According to Dr. Francine Benes, myelination levels increase 
into the early twenties. “During child development, myelination 
correlates with maturing patterns of behavior.”37 
This new research confirms that adolescent brain 
                                                          
(2006) (quoting Dr. Sowell). 
31 Interview: Jay Giedd, supra note 19. 
32 Spinks, Works in Progress, supra note 22 (quoting Dr. Giedd). Dr. 
Preuss stressed here that these assertions come from the scientists’ 
interpretations, not from empirically demonstrated fact. Id. 
33 Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, JUV. JUST. 
NEWSL. (AM. BAR ASSOC./JUV. JUST. CTR., D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 2, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal 
_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf. 
34 NIMH, Teenage Brain, supra note 14. 
35 Jay N. Giedd et al., Anatomical Brain Magnetic Resonance Imaging of 
Typically Developing Children and Adolescents, 48 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 465, 468 (2009). 
36 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 85 (citing R. Douglas Fields, White Matter 
in Learning, Cognition and Psychiatric Disorders, 31 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 
361 (2008)). 
37 Elizabeth Gudrais, Modern Myelination: The Brain at Midlife, HARV. 
MAG. (May–June 2001), http://harvardmagazine.com/2001/05/the-brain-at-
midlife.html (“Infants, for example, lack the fine motor coordination to move 
an index finger independently, since their nerves are insufficiently 
myelinated.”). Dr. Francine Benes has found that myelination growth 
increased again in the forties, growing an average of fifty percent again by 
the mid-fifties. Id.; see also NIMH, Teenage Brain, supra note 14. 
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development extends into the twenties, beyond “the age of 
consent” set in every state. Critical abilities—including impulse 
control, emotional regulation, planning, decision making, and 
organization—may not fully mature until the third decade of life. 
Additionally, behaviors and experiences may influence 
myelination and determine the winnowing and reorganization of 
gray matter during adolescence. It’s possible that teenagers 
subtly hard-wire experiences, such as algebra homework or sex 
in a Bee Line passenger car, into their brains. 
B. Cognitive Development 
Adolescents mature cognitively as well as physically. 
Cognitive changes include the development of the ability to think 
more abstractly than children do. Adolescents engage in counter-
factual reasoning, consider hypothetical situations, and can adopt 
a variety of perspectives on a subject.38 They think 
introspectively, examining their own thoughts and emotions. The 
evolution of these cognitive skills happens in unpredictable 
ways. Some teenagers employ advanced reasoning skills earlier 
and more often than do their peers. Additionally, situational 
factors influence individual reasoning performance. For 
example, when they experience familiar environments and 
situations, teenagers tend to employ more advanced cognitive 
reasoning.39 Dr. Linda Spear notes that some transient 
developmental declines appear for certain tasks, particularly for 
those involving stressful or anxiety provoking circumstances.40 
This information, combined with the theory on hard-wiring, 
suggests that we should not shelter teens from experimentation 
and gradual learning regarding sexuality, workplace 
relationships, and other concrete skills and abstract issues. 
Instead, we should facilitate their learning and maturation under 
circumstances that safeguard their developmental vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
38 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 101–02 (citing Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive 
and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 69 
(2005)). 
39 Id. at 102. 
40 Id. at 107–08. 
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Thus, attributing full capacity to minors may not safeguard 
them, just as insulating them from all experimentation could 
stunt their development. 
One important factor to remember when examining 
adolescent cognitive development and capacity is context. Adults 
should not take one developmental or functional milestone and 
extrapolate to pronounce any given adolescent mature. For 
example, research from the 1980s suggested that adolescent 
cognitive development enabled youth to make hypothetical 
decisions comparable to those of adults.41 Following the 
publication of these data and a number of high-profile violent 
crimes involving youth, prosecutors began trying more children 
as adults.42 The increase in the number of adolescents tried in 
criminal court as adults at the end of the twentieth-century 
prompted researchers to revisit the issue of adolescent cognitive 
competence.43 The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence 
Study investigated whether adolescents are competent, 
intellectually and emotionally, to stand trial in adult criminal 
court.44 Dr. Laurence Steinberg reported, “Our findings indicate 
that significant numbers of juveniles who are 15 and younger are 
probably not competent to stand trial as adults.”45 Dr. Steinberg 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Melinda G. Schmidt & N. Dickon Reppucci, Children’s 
Rights and Capacities, in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 76, 96 
(Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002) (discussing Lois A. Weithorn & Susan 
B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed 
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982)). 
42 See, e.g., Tony Freemantle, Lawmakers Get Tougher on Juvenile 
Offenders, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 26, 1998, at A26; see also Evelyn Nieves, 
California’s Governor Plays Tough on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at 
A16. 
43 MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, THE MACARTHUR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE 
STUDY SUMMARY 1 (2002) [hereinafter MACARTHUR COMPETENCE STUDY 
SUMMARY], available at www.adjj.org/downloads/58competence_study_ 
summary.pdf. 
44 Id. 
45 Press Release, Temple Univ., Many Kids 15 and Younger May Lack 
Maturity Necessary to be Competent to Stand Trial, Juvenile Justice Study 
Finds (Mar. 3, 2003) (available at https://www.temple.edu/news_media/ 
bb0302_593.html). 
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noted that “younger individuals were less likely to recognize the 
risks inherent in different choices and less likely to think about 
the long-term consequences of their choices . . . .”46 This last 
finding supports the neuroscience evidence regarding maturity in 
those brain sectors responsible for inhibition and decision 
making. According to this research, the competence of sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-olds to stand trial did not differ from the 
adults.47 MacArthur researchers were quick to point out, 
however, that the functioning of older juveniles was not 
necessarily equivalent to that of adults.48 Researchers emphasized 
that further inquiry into age differences in other capacities and 
abilities was ongoing for these older teenagers.49 
Further scientific research concerning adolescent brain 
function confirmed findings that teenage brains continue to 
mature beyond mid-adolescence. In 2009, Dr. Kurt Fischer and 
his colleagues announced that adolescent cognitive development 
does not cease at sixteen. They argued that “[m]ore complex 
skills such as reflective judgment, logical reasoning, and even 
working memory for sophisticated concepts . . . do not plateau 
in the teenage years.”50 Additionally, these skills vary 
dynamically across contexts. Factors such as stress, novelty, and 
self-organization drive variations. Fischer explained, for 
example: 
Reasoning about abortion, where a doctor or health-care 
worker can support the teen’s thinking over a length of 
time, is very different from acting violently in the heat of 
the moment. Teenagers’ capabilities are tied to contexts 
and emotional states. Teenagers are not simply 
cognitively mature and psychosocially immature. Context 
is radically implicated in the nature of 
capabilities . . . . Depending on context and support, the 
same individual can function in drastically different 
                                                          
46 MACARTHUR COMPETENCE STUDY SUMMARY, supra note 43, at 2. 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Kurt W. Fischer et al., Narrow Assessments Misrepresent Development 
and Misguide Policy, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595, 597 (2009). 
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ways, and there is not one condition that represents the 
true capacity.51 
This passage highlights, as psychologists have determined, that 
emotional states and other factors influence cognitive capability. 
Spear summarizes that “brain development through adolescence 
may be characterized not so much by increases in task-associated 
activation of the PFC [prefrontal cortex] and other frontal 
regions, per se, but by an increased reliance on distributed brain 
regions that function in ‘collaborative’ networks of activity with 
frontal regions such as the PFC.”52 Moreover, cognitive ability 
is not the only trait useful for effective function and decision 
making. Other traits come into play. 
C. Psychosocial Development 
Evidence of psychosocial maturation supports the notion that 
adolescents experience significant changes during not only their 
teenaged years, but also into their early twenties and beyond. 
Steinberg describes four psychosocial traits that distinguish 
adolescents from adults: capacity for self-regulation, reward 
sensitivity, future orientation, and peer influence.53 
1. Self-Regulation and Reward Sensitivity 
Characteristics common in teenagers mark the transition 
period that ultimately leads to adulthood. We know, for 
example, that adolescents take more and greater risks than do 
adults.54 Such behaviors include unprotected sex, drunk driving, 
use of illegal drugs, and criminal activity.55 Scientists once 
believed that teenagers differed from adults in their ability to 
                                                          
51 Id. at 598.  
52 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 125. 
53 Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 468 (2009). 
54 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 130–54; see also Elizabeth Cauffman & 
Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent 
Decision Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1767 (1995) (providing examples 
of adolescents’ frequent participation in dangerous activities). 
55 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 130. 
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perceive or calculate risks.56 Neither a lack of information nor 
cognitive capacity explains their risk-taking tendencies, however. 
Additionally, studies have demonstrated that increasing 
knowledge does not necessarily lead people to make better 
decisions.57 New evidence demonstrates that age differences in 
reward sensitivity may explain adolescent risk taking. Teens 
value rewards over risks more highly than do adults.58 
Dr. Laurence Steinberg explains adolescent risk taking 
behavior by examining two interacting neurobiological systems: 
a socioemotional system, which governs the processing of social 
and emotional information, and a cognitive control system, 
which directs deliberative thinking, impulse control, foresight, 
and the evaluation of risks and rewards.59 He suggests that a 
dramatic increase in dopaminergic activity within the 
socioemotional system at puberty leads to reward seeking.60 This 
change precedes the structural maturation of the cognitive 
control system.61 Steinberg argues that because the cognitive 
control system matures later in adolescence, the temporal gap in 
the development of these two systems “creates a period of 
heightened vulnerability to risk taking during middle 
adolescence.”62 
                                                          
56 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 469. 
57 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1771–72. 
58 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 469; see also SPEAR, supra note 11, at 
140 (defining sensation-seeking as “a complex trait associated with the desire 
for diverse, novel, complex, and intense experiences and the willingness to 
engage in risks to attain those experiences”). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Steinberg also distinguishes the maturation of the cognitive control 
system from the maturation of the frontal lobes through synaptic pruning. He 
notes that both result in improved thinking abilities but that they happen at 
different times with different implications for cognitive development. 
Steinberg, supra note 53, at 466. 
62 Id. While risk taking can be problematic or even life threatening, 
adaptive benefits also exist, including “opportunities to explore adult 
behaviors and privileges, to face and conquer challenges, to master the 
developmental difficulties of adolescence, and to increase status and peer 
affiliation within certain peer groups.” SPEAR, supra note 11, at 135 
(citations omitted). 
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2. Future Orientation 
Other studies suggest that adolescents hold different priorities 
than do adults. In particular, teens “view long-term 
consequences as less important than short-term consequences.”63 
For example, teenagers engage in more delay discounting than 
do adults, preferring smaller immediate awards over larger but 
delayed rewards.64 Self-regulation develops “through 
adolescence, with gains continuing through the high school years 
and into young adulthood.”65 Research suggests that development 
of future-time orientation “continues beyond mid-adolescence, at 
least through the last year of college.”66 New evidence links 
future orientation with “brain structure and function, especially 
in the prefrontal cortex.”67 
Teenagers also engage in more impulsive behavior than 
average adults. Spear defines impulsivity as the “tendency to 
react spontaneously without thinking much beforehand as to the 
consequences.”68 Preliminary studies of juvenile impulsivity 
suggest that it remains relatively stable until age sixteen when it 
increases and then again stabilizes at age nineteen. Impulsivity 
declines during adulthood. More investigation is needed 
regarding the relation between impulsivity, sensation-seeking, 
and judgmental maturity. Stress and mood state also influence 
temperate decision making. Studies indicate that older teenagers 
exhibit greater mood volatility than do adults.69 
3. Peer Influence 
Researchers (and most parents) know that peers heavily 
influence teenagers. Steinberg reports that as juveniles form a 
sense of their own identity during adolescence and young 
                                                          
63 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1773. 
64 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 143. 
65 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 470. 
66 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1787. 
67 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 469. 
68 SPEAR, supra note 11, at 142. 
69 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1781–82. 
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adulthood, they “develop a greater capacity for autonomous 
decision making and begin to resist peer influence.”70 Until a 
sense of adult identity and autonomy matures, teenagers make 
choices influenced both directly and indirectly by peers. Direct 
coercion affects some decisions, but many others result from an 
adolescent’s concern for peer approval and fear of rejection.71 
Evidence confirms that teens are preoccupied with social status.72 
Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman and Dr. Laurence Steinberg report that 
adolescents are most susceptible to peer influence at about age 
fourteen, after which that influence declines. Studies, however, 
indicate that a coherent sense of identity does not emerge until 
about age eighteen. Ego development or individuation, according 
to some studies, increases throughout adolescent years. 
As teens individuate, other people exert influences that affect 
various aspects of adolescent life. For example, parents 
influence adolescents in matters of religion and career choice, 
whereas peers sway choices regarding daily concerns such as 
clothing and music preferences.73 Cauffman and Steinberg 
suggest that “adolescents’ display of independence—and hence, 
maturity of judgment—may be highly situation-specific, with 
youngsters being influenced more on some topics than others, 
and by different sources of influence to differing degrees, 
depending on the decision in question.”74 
                                                          
70 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 468. 
71 Id. at 469. 
72 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1773. 
73 Id. at 1774–75. 
74 Id. at 1775. In 1995, when theorizing about traits other than cognition 
that operate in mature decision making, Steinberg and Cauffman defined 
“maturity of judgment”: 
These psychosocial traits comprise what we call “maturity of 
judgment” . . . . [M]aturity of judgment can be further broken down 
into three core components: (1) responsibility, which includes 
healthy autonomy, self-reliance, and clarity of identity; (2) 
perspective, or the ability to acknowledge the complexity of a 
situation and see it as part of a broader context; and (3) temperance, 
which refers to the ability to limit impulsive and emotional decision 
making, to evaluate situations thoroughly before acting (which may 
involve seeking the advice of others when appropriate), and to avoid 
decision making extremes.  
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As with the new neuroscience, the research regarding 
psychosocial traits, various specific ages, and maturity of 
judgment is quite new. Understandably, psychologists hesitate to 
draw specific conclusions for the practical application of what 
they now know.75 This new information, however, raises several 
important questions for our purposes. For example, who 
influences an adolescent’s decision to have sex with an adult bus 
driver (assuming that she does actually consent)? A parent? Her 
peers? Social media? Only the driver? Moreover, if she has not 
formed a coherent independent identity, should we consider her 
“consent” to sex with an adult service provider, teacher, or co-
worker legally significant? Do adolescent impulsivity and 
moodiness combine with stress (including pressure for sex) to 
influence a teen’s decision making process? Should the law 
regard teen “consent,” given impulsively and under stress, as 
significant and legally binding? In light of what we know about 
teen priorities, including social status and immediate rewards, 
one can see how sex with an adult, for example a teacher, might 
seem like a good idea. De-emphasizing the long-term academic 
career, reputation, and health risks, a teen might choose an 
exciting sexual relationship and the concomitant status increase 
with an older, more “sophisticated” man offering such a prize. 
4. Adolescent Capacity and Physical Appearance 
The research regarding adolescent neurological, cognitive, 
and psychosocial development is new and ongoing. We cannot 
draw many firm conclusions about physical changes and 
behavior. Nor do we fully understand the subtle dynamics of 
behavior, emotions, environment, and physiology. Does any of 
this really matter, though? 
Assume for a moment that adolescent “consent” should not 
be legally binding because adolescents do not have the power, 
(equal) status, and/or competence to consent to sex with an 
                                                          
Id. at 1764-65. These three core components correspond to the four traits 
about which Steinberg later writes: peer influence, future orientation, reward 
sensitivity, and the capacity for self-regulation. Steinberg, supra note 53, at 
468. 
75 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1780. 
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adult. Will jurists account for the adolescent’s developing 
capacity, status, and power in their allocation of rights and 
liabilities? 
Donald Kramer and Jennifer Soper suggest that while many 
people claim to base the attribution of rights on competency, 
they often judge competency and assign rights based on physical 
appearance.76 Thus, society treats the children who look 
physically mature as adults, whether or not those adolescents are 
emotionally, neurologically, or psychosocially mature. 
According to neuroscientist Dr. Bea Luna, “An adolescent can 
look so much like an adult, but cognitively, they are not really 
there yet . . . .”77 Referring to appearances of physical maturity 
in adolescents, Dr. Yurgelun-Todd cautions, “[T]hey may not 
appreciate [] consequences or weigh information the same way 
as adults do. So we may be mistaken [that someone is 
emotionally and psychosocially mature. Even though] we think 
[he or she] looks physically mature, [his or her] brain may in 
fact not be mature . . . .”78 
For an example of this phenomenal assumption of maturity, 
examine the statutory rape defenses. Under this criminal scheme, a 
minor lacks capacity even if she “consents,” so her “consent” is no 
defense. Her physical maturity, however, might constitute one. In 
California, the perpetrator’s mistake of age, particularly of older 
victims—arguably based on physical maturity—can be a defense.79 
Even if we cannot yet make firm conclusions regarding 
adolescent “developing capacity”80 and judgmental maturity, we 
                                                          
76 Jennifer Soper, Straddling the Line: Adolescent Pregnancy and 
Questions of Capacity, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 195, 199 (1999). 
77 Powell, supra note 30, at 865 (quoting Dr. Bea Luna) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
78 Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, supra note 33 
(quoting Dr. Deborah Yurgelun-Todd) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In 
Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 52 n.219 (1997) (citing 
People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964)). 
80 In 2004, I first introduced the notion of “developing capacity.” 
Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and 
a Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 518 (2004). I distinguished the 
concept from “diminished capacity” because “diminished” carries a negative 
connotation and suggests that capacity should exist or may once have existed. 
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should at least avoid confusing physical maturity with 
neurological and psychosocial maturity when we assign legal 
rights and duties. Neither the blooming of the adult body nor its 
withering with disease or old age necessarily equates with 
mental maturity or acuity. 
A brief review of adolescent development permits us to come 
back to the law’s treatment of adolescents with a fresh 
perspective. At the very least, we can begin to evaluate whether 
the law takes us in the right direction. I argue that it does not. 
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDANCE RELEVANT TO 
JUVENILES 
Before examining case law and the factors that might guide legal 
reform concerning civil law’s treatment of adolescent “consent,” we 
should explore the definitions of some key legal terms. 
A. Consent, Assent, and Acquiescence 
Consent means “to give permission for something to happen; 
agree to do something.”81 Slightly different from consent, assent 
means “to express approval or agreement.”82 By this definition, 
assent denotes cooperation or secondary status. Both terms 
arguably include two prerequisites: knowledge regarding the 
choice, and volition. In the first aspect, consent and assent must 
be informed and correspond to the activity they legitimate. 
Ignorant cooperation does not indicate consent or assent. 
Additionally, any misrepresentation taints responsive consent or 
assent. The individual must also possess the cognitive ability to 
reason about a choice. In the second aspect, consent and assent 
must indicate freedom of choice and volition. The individual 
must be able to guide her own responsive choices. To acquiesce 
                                                          
Id. I argued, “[m]ost teenagers suffer not from impairment but from 
immaturity—a blameless condition and a natural phase of growth.” Id. at 
518–19. 
81 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 362 (Erin McKean ed., 2d 
ed. 2005). 
82 Id. at 94. 
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means “to accept something reluctantly but without protest”83 
and indicates neither full consent nor assent. 
In distinguishing acquiescence, we add a third requirement 
for consent and assent: a measure of power and autonomy. For 
example, if someone has no opportunity or authority to dissent, 
can we value that person’s consent? Consent and assent must be 
free of coercion and duress. Arguably, they assume a level of 
equality and mutuality between those persons making a bargain 
or coming to an agreement. Consent carries with it a 
presumption of intellectual, emotional, and developmental 
capacity. These characteristics are what undergird legal capacity. 
B. Legal Consent and Capacity 
This elucidation of consent is consistent with its interpretation 
in Section 892A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Subsection 
(2)(a) specifies that in order to extinguish tort liability, consent 
must be “by one who has the capacity to consent.”84 A comment 
to this subsection provides:  
If, however, the one who consents is not capable of 
appreciating the nature, extent or probable consequences 
of the conduct, the consent is not effective to bar liability 
unless the parent, guardian, or other person empowered to 
consent for the incompetent has given consent, in which 
case the consent of the authorized person will be effective 
even though the incompetent does not consent . . . . 85 
This passage clarifies that one who consents must understand 
what he or she is doing and be able to anticipate results. Such 
appreciation requires counterfactual thinking or “what if” 
reasoning. This explanation focuses on the cognitive aspects of 
consent. 
Contract law has also examined the notions of legal consent 
and capacity. Contract law has long held that minors lack the 
capacity to consent.86 This conclusion results, in part, from the 
                                                          
83 Id. at 14. 
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a) (1979). 
85 Id. § 892A cmt. b (emphasis added). 
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2)(a) (1981). 
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fear that adults may take legal advantage of minors who make 
contractual agreements. Contract law, therefore, typically makes 
contracts by minors voidable by those minors.87 
Contract law also distinguishes between cognitive and 
volitional incapacity, especially in the context of mental 
disabilities. Section 15(1) of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts states that: 
A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by 
entering into a transaction if by reason of mental illness 
or defect 
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the 
nature and consequences of the transaction, or 
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation 
to the transaction and the other party has reason to know 
of his condition.88 
Subsection (a) mirrors the torts guidance above. However, (b) 
relates to volitional incapacity or the inability to regulate one’s 
responses in a social context. Some incapacitated individuals 
may understand the nature of a transaction or conduct but not be 
able to control their responsive behavior reasonably. 
Comment b. to section 15 explains: 
Even though understanding is complete, [an incapacitated 
man] may lack the ability to control his acts in the way 
that [a] normal individual can and does control them; in 
such cases the inability makes the contract voidable only 
if the other party has reason to know of his condition. 
Where a person has some understanding of a particular 
transaction which is affected by mental illness or defect, 
the controlling consideration is whether the transaction in 
its result is one which a reasonably competent person 
might have made.89 
This passage naturally prompts the question whether some 
teenagers may suffer from a similar volitional incapacity or 
                                                          
87 See, e.g., Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo. 1981); JEFF 
FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 603–04 (2d ed. 2009). 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1).  
89 Id. § 15 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
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“defect.” One might argue that a teenager “may lack the ability 
to control his acts in the way that [a] normal individual [adult] 
can and does control them . . . .”90 For example, she may 
understand the facts regarding sexual activity but not be able to 
control her conduct the way an adult would. 
Different disciplines use a variety of terms to express the 
notion of adolescent behavior as markedly dissimilar to adult 
behavior. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as 
psychosocial immaturity.91 Legal scholars sometimes refer to this 
difference as “diminished capacity.”92 I find the term 
“diminished capacity” inappropriate because the word 
“diminished” carries a negative connotation. Additionally, it 
suggests that full capacity should exist or may once have 
existed. Most teenagers suffer not from impairment but from 
immaturity—a blameless condition and a natural phase of 
growth. I prefer the term “developing capacity” because of a 
teenager’s transitional status from childhood to adulthood and 
her developing maturity. Semantics aside, the question remains 
whether contract law’s guidance on incapacity accurately 
describes many adolescents, at one point or another in their 
development. I suggest later that it does. 
                                                          
90 Id. 
91 See, e.g., Kathryn Lynn Modecki, “It’s a Rush”: Psychosocial 
Content of Antisocial Decision Making, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 183–
84 (2009). 
92 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 799, 829–36 (2003). Because of the need to protect society 
from crimes committed by adolescents, I endorse Professors Elizabeth Scott 
and Laurence Steinberg’s proposal that the juvenile justice system recognize 
adolescent “diminished responsibility” due to diminished culpability. 
However, I reassert that adolescents—even adolescent criminal offenders—
lack full adult legal capacity. Moreover, I do not suggest a “diminished 
culpability” or “diminished responsibility” parallel for the civil system 
because my focus is the protection of youth, and their developing capacity, 
from exploitation by adults. I would still shield adolescents from legal 
responsibility for their immature choices because adult exploitation causes 
their injury. The need to protect society (and individual victims) from crimes 
committed by adolescents, however, justifies the different treatment in the 
criminal system of adolescent “developing capacity” and the different level of 
legal responsibility (and culpability) attributed to adolescent criminal 
offenders. 
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C. Medical Assent 
While this discussion of key terms has highlighted the 
similarities between consent and assent, government regulation 
of human-subject medical research brings nuanced meaning to 
assent as it applies to children in that context.93 The Code of 
Federal Regulations mandates that Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) may approve research on children if “adequate provisions 
are made for soliciting the assent of the children and the 
permission of their parents or guardians.”94 The IRB decides 
whether the child is even “capable of providing assent” by 
considering the child’s age, maturity, and psychological state.95 
IRBs may waive parental permission only under special 
circumstances.96 No additional guidance suggests how IRBs 
should weigh these factors. Thus, medical assent does not equate 
with legal consent since parental permission—consent—typically 
bolsters a child’s assent. Moreover, Cauffman and Steinberg 
caution, “Adolescents who demonstrate that they meet the 
criteria for informed [medical] consent may nevertheless lack the 
psychosocial maturity required to make consistently mature 
judgments.”97 Additionally, one might argue that capacity for 
medical assent does not equate with legal capacity since the 
decisions contemplated are so narrowly defined and well-
informed. The responsibility for any decision to conduct medical 
research on a minor typically is shared by the researchers, IRB, 
the parents, and lastly by the juvenile. 
D. Juvenile “Consent” and Capacity 
People considering juvenile legal autonomy might agree that 
teenagers are capable of assent and acquiescence. Similarly, 
even a six-year-old may “know” or recognize Barack Obama 
and Mitt Romney and may “voluntarily” pick one or the other 
                                                          
93 I thank Professor Lois Weithorn for her guidance on this topic. 
94 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (2010). 
95 § 46.408(a). 
96 § 46.408(c). 
97 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 54, at 1766. 
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for President. We do not allow that child to cast a political vote, 
however.98 Additionally, we might agree that many juveniles 
understand the concept of sexual intercourse.99 Their knowledge 
of the mechanics of sexual activity does not necessarily qualify 
them, however, as competent decision makers or as ready to 
engage in the behavior. Many adults, judges, and courts 
disagree. For them, relative cognitive maturity, or even apparent 
physical maturity, equates with adult capacity. They ignore or 
are ignorant of the level of psychosocial maturity required for 
competent decision making. 
E. General Legal Principles and the Scientific Research 
Common law and legal treatises have guided the law’s 
treatment of teenagers for years. The new science of adolescent 
development arguably undermines some of this legal “wisdom.”  
1. The “Rule of Sevens” and the Restatements 
Current law, embodied in the “rule of sevens,”100 explicitly 
posits that most teenagers have the legal capacity to consent. 
Under this traditional rule, a minor under age seven cannot give 
consent, be held liable for negligent conduct, or formulate the 
requisite mental state to engage in criminal conduct. From 
seven- to fourteen-years-old, the law presumes that a minor 
lacks capacity. From fourteen to twenty-one (now eighteen), 
courts operate under a rebuttable presumption that minors are 
                                                          
98 I would, however, permit high school students, who have successfully 
completed a high school U.S. government or civics class and who have 
passed a basic knowledge test (similar to a written driver’s license test), to 
participate in elections. 
99 See, e.g., People v. Hillhouse, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 268 (Ct. App. 
2003) (“[W]e would not assume—nor would we infer a legislative 
presumption—that the average 14 year old in our current society does not 
possess the intelligence capable of understanding the nature and consequences 
of a sexual act.”). 
100 In the criminal system, this rule is also known as the infancy defense. 
See generally MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 180–81 
(1997) (discussing the infancy defense and capacity to commit a crime). 
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competent to consent and are responsible for criminal and 
negligent conduct.101 Thus, in the context of a civil claim for 
damages and absent evidence to the contrary, the bright-line rule 
allows a trier of fact to presume that a child over fourteen 
consents to sexual contact. 
As noted above, legal treatises and guidance also 
acknowledge that children may lack legal capacity to make 
binding legal decisions and offer legal consent. Section 15 of the 
Second Restatement of Contracts addresses volitional incapacity, 
suggesting that some incapacitated persons who cannot conform 
their behavior to societal norms may void their contracts. 
Section 892A comment 2(b) of the Second Restatement of Torts 
explains, however, that “[i]f the person consenting is a child or 
one of deficient mental capacity, the consent may still be 
effective if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent and 
probable consequences of the conduct consented to . . . .” 
The new scientific data concerning adolescents calls into 
question whether young teenagers possess full legal capacity 
and, in particular, whether most teenagers are capable of 
knowing and voluntary consent to sex with an adult. What 
neuroscientists and psychologists have said regarding capacity 
informs this issue. Dr. Abigail Baird, who specializes in 
adolescent neurological development, suggests that “. . . it may 
be physically impossible for adolescents to engage in 
counterfactual reasoning and as a result of this are often unable 
to effectively foresee the possible consequences of their 
actions.”102 This statement directly undermines tort guidance that 
children may have legal capacity. 
Dr. Silvia Bunge has compared the prefrontal cortex of 
children with those adults suffering from injuries, who take 
more risks than do healthy adults. She has determined that 
children make riskier choices than adults, in part because they 
enjoy doing so. She tied these choices to activity in the 
prefrontal cortex. Bunge suggests that teens are less able to 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 Abigail Baird & Jonathan Fugelsang, The Emergence of Consequential 
Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, in LAW & THE BRAIN 254 (Semir Zeki 
& Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). 
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resist the temptation of a new reward. She explains, “If your 
friend says, ‘Hey let’s try this drug; it will be fun,’ you might 
not be able to use the information you know about the possible 
negative consequences to resist . . . .”103 Bunge’s research 
suggests that even knowing participation in an activity might not 
justify the attribution of full legal capacity. 
These legal examples, when viewed side-by-side with 
science, suggest that we need to pay serious attention to 
traditional legal presumptions about adolescents and consider 
incorporating more about what we now know concerning 
adolescent development. A few federal and state courts are 
doing just that. 
2. Science and the United States Supreme Court Precedents 
Even the United States Supreme Court has noticed the 
importance of the new science on adolescent development.104 The 
Supreme Court’s recent Graham v. Florida opinion, which 
relied on amici briefing regarding adolescent neurological and 
psychosocial development, provides valuable guidance relevant 
to adolescent maturity, “consent,” and legal capacity.105 The 
Graham decision holds that a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole for particular juvenile offenders violates the Eighth 
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.106 
This decision also reaffirms evidence regarding adolescent 
neurological and psychosocial development, discussed in Roper 
v. Simmons,107 which invalidated the death penalty for minors. 
                                                          
103 The Adolescent Brain, SCI. TODAY U.C. (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www. 
ucop.edu/sciencetoday/article/18977. 
104 For the most recent discussion of the science regarding adolescent 
conduct and behavior, see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2761–79 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing recent scientific research 
correlating playing violent video games with aggressive behavior in 
adolescents to support the contention that the first amendment does not 
disable the government from placing statutory restrictions upon the sale of 
video games to minors). 
105 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010). 
106 Id. at 2033–34. 
107 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–71 (2005). 
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The Graham Court noted that “developments in psychology and 
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between 
juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain 
involved in behavior control continue to mature through late 
adolescence.”108 
The Graham Court found that society might still hold a 
teenager responsible for his behavior but that “his transgression 
‘is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”109 This 
distinction between responsibility and moral culpability is 
important. If a toddler knocks over a vase while stumbling to a 
table, we might find him responsible but not morally culpable 
because he did not intend to break the vase and lacked the motor 
coordination to control his steps and body. Extend this example 
to a teenager who may be technically “responsible” for saying 
“yes” to sex, or who may even initiate sexual activity, but who 
cannot fully anticipate the consequences of her conduct and may 
lack the psychosocial skills to control her behavior in context. 
The Graham Court highlighted several developmental factors 
that might influence our decision to spare adolescents from legal 
responsibility for their behavior, even as we recognize their 
personal responsibility. The Court affirmed, “As compared to 
adults, juveniles have a ‘“lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not 
as well formed.’”110 The Court also noted “juveniles’ ‘lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often 
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions . . . .’”111  
The Graham Court recognized that even a psychological 
evaluation of a given adolescent, of the type necessitated by 
some of the cases discussed below, might not yield enough 
information for jurists to make critical legal determinations 
                                                          
108 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citations omitted). 
109 Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) 
(plurality opinion)). 
110 Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
111 Id. at 2028 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
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about a particular youth. The Court stated that “‘even expert 
psychologists’” might find it difficult to differentiate between 
adolescent conduct that results from “transient immaturity” and 
that which reflects “irreparable corruption.”112 This finding 
suggests that a case-by-case determination of adolescent maturity 
in a criminal or civil case might produce unsatisfactory or 
flawed results concerning the capacity of a teenager to control 
his behavior or consent to sex. 
Recent Supreme Court focus on adolescent neurological and 
psychosocial development and the differences between 
adolescent and adult conduct emphasizes the need to consider 
these differences and adolescent capacity in contexts other than 
criminal trials. We need to explore further whether adolescent 
development and psychosocial maturity should also guide the 
development of civil law and particularly the law regarding “the 
age of consent.”  
III. “CONSENT” VERSUS CONSENT IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CIVIL 
LAW 
In Doe v. Starbucks,113 a California federal district court 
analyzed whether a minor could bring a civil sexual harassment 
case against her supervisor and employer when she “consented” 
to some or most of the alleged offensive conduct.114 While this 
case arose in California and was decided using California civil 
law regarding “the age of consent,” this controversy could have 
easily arisen at a Starbucks in New York. We will return to 
Starbucks to explore its relevance for the nation after discussing 
relevant New York law. For now, however, we focus on the 
legal significance of the “consent” that was pivotal in Starbucks, 
                                                          
112 Id. at 2029 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
113 Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 
5183773, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (granting in part and denying in 
part motions for summary judgment). This case was set to go to trial the 
week of June 15, 2010. However, according to the court clerk, the case 
settled. E-mail from Lisa Bredahl, Court Clerk to the Honorable Andrew J. 
Guilford, to author (Aug. 24, 2010) (on file with author). 
114 Starbucks, at *4–5, *7–8.  
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as it is in any sexual harassment case involving an adult. In 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the United States Supreme 
Court emphasized that, in a sexual harassment case under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),115 the 
“objectionable environment must be both objectively and 
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive and one that the victim in fact did perceive to 
be so.”116 One might refer to the objective component as the 
“reasonableness” standard and to the subjective element as the 
“unwelcomeness” requirement. Every state fair employment 
practice statute (FEPS) that similarly prohibits sexual harassment 
also makes “unwelcomeness” an element of the prima facie 
case.117 Thus, if Doe’s “consent” garners legal significance, she 
loses her sexual harassment case because the conduct is not 
subjectively “unwelcome.” 
The complicating factor for employers defending sexual 
harassment cases (or tort claims like the one in Barton v. Bee 
Line, Inc.) and the jurists evaluating those cases arises from 
state sex crime statutes that specifically prohibit sexual conduct 
with minors. Typically, “consent” provides no defense for the 
criminally-accused adult. So, what happens when criminal and 
civil claims stem from the same conduct? Is the minor’s 
“consent” treated consistently? Not in all states, including New 
York and California. A review of several cases decided since 
Bee Line superbly showcases the conflicts that can lead to 
bizarre results. 
A. New York Criminal Law 
Section 130.05(3)(a) of the New York Penal Law states, “A 
person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is: (a) 
less than 17 years old . . . .”118 Section 130.25 (2) prohibits 
                                                          
115 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(2006). 
116 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citing 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993)). 
117 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940–12951 (West 2010); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 290–301 (McKinney 2010). 
118 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3) (McKinney 2009). 
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sexual intercourse between an adult twenty-one or older and a 
youth under seventeen.119 According to the New York Court of 
Appeals, this code section “creates an irrebuttable presumption 
that a child less than [seventeen] years of age cannot consent to 
sexual intercourse with an adult . . . .”120 Other New York 
criminal statutes similarly prohibit adults from engaging in 
sexual acts with youth under seventeen years old.121 New York 
courts view a juvenile involved in such conduct as “victimized, 
regardless of whether or not she or he actually consents or even 
initiates the sexual encounter.”122 
In People v. Gonzalez,123 the defendant challenged on 
constitutional grounds a New York statute that proscribed oral 
and anal sexual acts with a minor under seventeen. The County 
Court acknowledged that minors enjoy most constitutional rights 
afforded adults, including some privacy rights. The court 
explained, however, that a state’s interest in protecting juveniles 
justifies limitations on certain rights. The court noted in 
particular that “the state has the authority to regulate the sexual 
conduct of its minors by setting age limits to establish whether 
the individual is sufficiently mature to make intelligent and 
informed decisions and to consent to certain activities.”124 
These New York criminal cases lead one to believe that the 
New York statutory rape laws are relevant and controlling 
precedent in every New York court. After all, if a juvenile lacks 
the capacity to consent to sex in the criminal context, what 
would miraculously enable him or her to develop legal capacity 
                                                          
119 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(2) (McKinney 2009). 
120 People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 n.3 (N.Y. 1995). 
121 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.40 (McKinney 2009) (prohibiting 
an adult over twenty-one from engaging in oral or anal sexual conduct with a 
minor under seventeen); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 2008) 
(prohibiting the use by an adult of a child under seventeen in a sexual 
performance). 
122 In re Rosaly S., No. NA-00012, 2010 WL 1493147, at *15 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. Mar. 26, 2010). 
123 People v. Gonzalez, 561 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Cnty. Ct. 1990). 
124 Id. at 361 (citing People v. Dozier, 417 N.E.2d 1008 (N.Y. 1980); 
Michael M. v. Superior Court Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 473 n.8 
(1981)). 
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in a civil case? If an adult victimizes a minor, even if that youth 
initiates the conduct, how is the victimization any less 
cognizable in civil court? Was Barton v. Bee Line, Inc. an 
unfortunate bumble, which has since been overruled? Anyone 
who thinks so is mistaken.125 
B. New York Civil Law 
New York civil cases since Bee Line have held regularly that 
consent, including juvenile consent, may insulate alleged 
tortfeasors from liability. For example, in O’Connor v. Western 
Freight Association, a 1962 civil assault and battery case 
involving two males in a fight, the court cited Bee Line for the 
proposition that consent operates as a complete defense in a tort 
action.126 Fast forward to 1993 and Stavroula S. v. Guerriera, a 
civil assault and battery case brought on behalf of a female 
under fourteen who allegedly consented to sex with the 
defendant.127 The court denied a motion for partial summary 
judgment because the associated statutory rape case had not 
resolved whether the plaintiff had consented. Consent was not at 
issue or relevant in the criminal case involving the strict liability 
prosecution under Penal Law section 130.30. The court reasoned 
that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the 
defendant from litigating the issue of whether he touched the 
plaintiff without her consent, which is the gravamen of the tort 
of battery.”128 The court did not address the question of how the 
plaintiff could have consented if she lacked the legal capacity to 
consent. 
In C. Roe v. Barad, a similar 1996 battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress case, the New York Supreme 
Court reversed a lower court decision, granting the fifteen-year-
old plaintiff partial summary judgment.129 The appellate court 
                                                          
125 See, e.g., Drobac, supra note 80, at 508 n.206 (discounting cases 
decided before 1945 because of the prevailing sexual norms). 
126 O’Connor v. W. Freight Ass’n, 202 F. Supp. 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962). 
 127 Stavroula S. v. Guerriera, 598 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (App. Div. 1993). 
128 Stavroula S., 598 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (citations omitted). 
 129 Roe v. Barad, 647 N.Y.S.2d 14 (App. Div. 1996).  
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ruled that Penal Law section 130.05(3), which declares that a 
minor cannot consent to sex with an adult, had no application in 
the tort action. The court found that the defendant could argue 
both consent and lack of emotional distress.130 The court cited to 
both Stavroula S. and Bee Line to support its conclusion.131 
Again, the court did not address the apparent conflict between 
the treatment of legal capacity in the criminal and civil contexts. 
The court also failed to explain why “Roe” wasn’t a named 
plaintiff. If Roe was such a capable and calculating actor, why 
allow her to sue under an alias? 
More recently, in Doe v. Board of Education of Penfield 
School District,132 suit was filed on behalf of a fifteen-year-old 
student against the school district for negligent supervision after 
a sexual assault perpetrated by a seventeen-year-old fellow 
student. The court held, “A school may not be liable where 
older minors, who are capable of understanding and appreciating 
their conduct, intentionally avoid detection to go to a prohibited 
and secluded portion of the school building and engage in 
consensual sex.”133 The court emphasized, “The Penal 
Code § 130.05 precluding sexual consent by children under 17 
years of age may not be applicable in a civil suit.”134 The court 
cited O’Connor and Barad for support.135 It cited no scientific 
journals or articles for the proposition that a fifteen-year-old is 
capable of understanding and appreciating her conduct 
concerning sexual activity such that she can give legal consent. 
Doe may have been capable in this case, but we have no 
information that an evaluation of her capacity to consent was 
even contemplated or attempted. The irony is that society 
believes her incapable of suing in her own capacity. The caption 
                                                          
130 Id. at 16. The defendant had pled guilty to a violation of Penal 
Law § 263.05 which prohibited the use of a child under seventeen in a sexual 
performance. However, that conviction also did not estop defendant from 
asserting consent. Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Doe v. Bd. of Educ., No. 04/6902, 2006 WL 2406532 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 10, 2006). 
133 Id. at *3. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
94 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
begins “In the Matter of the Claim of Jane Doe . . . .” The 
court did not address the conflict between criminal and civil tort 
law, the use of the alias, nor the court procedural rules, which 
mandate suit by adults on behalf of these otherwise capable 
minors. 
Only a concurring opinion in a 2002 civil case calls into 
question the Bee Line precedent. In Colon v. Jarvis, a mother 
filed suit on behalf of her fifteen-year-old daughter who had 
engaged in an allegedly consensual sexual relationship with a 
high school teacher.136 He was ultimately convicted of “six 
counts of sodomy in the third degree, three counts of rape in the 
third degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a 
child . . . .”137 Citing to Bee Line, the school district argued that 
it could not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior 
because Colon, who had consented to sex with Jarvis, could not 
recover from him. The majority pointed out that Colon had 
relied not on a theory of respondeat superior against the district 
but on theories of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, of 
Jarvis. Thus, her consent was not really at issue and the court 
denied summary judgment. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sondra Miller criticized Bee 
Line as “contrary to the contemporaneous weight of authority 
from New York and from many other jurisdictions which did 
not preclude civil recovery by an under-aged victim for an 
adult’s sexual predations.”138 She cited a number of cases from 
other jurisdictions that permit recovery and noted that only one 
New York case, Aadland v. Flynn,139 was decided upon Bee 
Line’s precedential authority (Doe v. Bd. of Edu. of Penfield 
Sch. Dist. had yet to be decided). It is not clear why Judge 
Miller failed to acknowledge Barad. Judge Miller concluded, 
“In my opinion, Barton was of questionable merit when it was 
decided, and its holding should be re-examined at the 
                                                          
136 Colon v. Jarvis, 742 N.Y.S.2d 304, 304–05 (App. Div. 2002). 
137 Id. at 305. 
138 Id. at 306 (Miller, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
139 Aadland v. Flynn, 211 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224–25 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff’d, 
218 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 1961) (rejecting a claim for moral debauchery 
and corruption as a seduction claim which was abolished by New York 
statute). 
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appropriate time.”140 Judge Miller was the only woman on this 
judicial panel. One wonders whether her gender influenced her 
opinion of Barton. 
This review of New York criminal and civil law permits us 
to return to the Starbucks case to evaluate how a teenaged New 
York franchise worker might fare in a sexual harassment suit 
against her employer. 
C. Starbucks New York Style 
Starbucks hired Jane Doe in July 2005 when she was sixteen 
years old. She worked closely with her supervisor, Timothy 
Horton, who was then twenty-four years old. After her hire, 
Horton allegedly asked Doe out on dates repeatedly and she 
initially rebuffed his advances.141 In pleadings, Doe declared that 
Horton made “‘perhaps hundreds’” of sexually explicit or 
profane statements to her at work in front of coworkers 
concerning his sexual interest in her.142 Later, she “finally said 
‘yes,’ hoping it would make him stop.”143 They ultimately 
engaged in sexual activity in November or December 2005.144 
Doe declared,  
[Horton] demanded that I perform oral sex on him, 
which I did. I felt like I had to—that I had no 
choice . . . . I felt that, because he had given me 
marijuana and I had smoked it with him, I had to do 
what he said, because he was my Supervisor and I didn’t 
want to lose my job.145  
                                                          
140 Colon, 742 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (Miller, J., concurring). 
141 Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 
5183773, at *1–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
142 Id. at *2 (quoting Starbucks’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence at 
9:9–10:8, Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773). 
143 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *1 (quoting Doe Declaration ¶ 4, 
Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773). 
144 Id. at *2. 
145 Id. at *3 (quoting Doe Declaration, supra note 143, ¶ 20) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Doe and Horton engaged in sexual activities 
regularly through June 2006. In addition to “vaginal intercourse and oral 
copulation” at work and offsite, “[t]hey exchanged explicit sexual comments 
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Horton told Doe not to tell anyone about their relationship. 
In February 2006, however, Doe told her mother that she 
was having sex with Horton. Doe’s mother requested an 
investigation and that Starbucks take steps to protect her 
daughter. Store Manager Lina Nobel did not ask Horton about a 
sexual relationship “because she thought it was not her place to 
do so.”146 Nobel informed Doe’s mother that Horton had “denied 
any wrongdoing with [Doe], . . . and if she fired him or 
terminated him, she was afraid that she was going to have a 
wrongful termination claim on her hands.”147 Thereafter, Doe 
requested a transfer to a different Starbucks store “because she 
‘felt like she had to.’”148 Finally, in 2006, Doe left her job and 
“enrolled in a treatment facility out of state to address mental and 
emotional problems . . . .”149 Horton ultimately pled guilty to 
criminal unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 
California Penal Code Section 261.5(a).150 In that associated 
criminal case, Doe’s “consent” to sex failed to provide Horton 
with a legal defense.  
In the civil sexual harassment case later filed on behalf of 
Doe, however, the federal court left open the possibility that 
Doe’s “consent” might serve to insulate Starbucks and Horton 
from civil liability. The Starbucks federal court relied on 
California state legal authority, quoting the California Supreme 
Court decision in People v. Tobias:151 
In 1970, the Legislature created the crime of unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5) and amended 
the rape statute (§ 261) so that it no longer included sex 
                                                          
and text messages at work.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 20, 25, Starbucks, 2009 
WL 5183773). 
146 Id. at *5. 
147 Id. at *6 (quoting J.M. Deposition at 187:18–24, Starbucks, 2009 WL 
5183773) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, supra note 
145, ¶ 40). 
149 Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, supra note 
145, ¶ 59). 
150 Id. (citations omitted). 
151 People v. Tobias, 21 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001). 
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with a minor in the definition of rape. As a result, the 
circumstances surrounding sexual intercourse with a 
minor became highly relevant, because this conduct 
might in some cases be a distinct and less serious crime 
than rape, particularly where the minor engages in the 
sexual act knowingly and voluntarily.152 
Oddly, neither section 261.5 nor section 261 refers to a minor 
acting “knowingly and voluntarily.” The Court continued: 
In making this change [declassifying the behavior as rape], 
the Legislature implicitly acknowledged that, in some 
cases at least, a minor may be capable of giving legal 
consent to sexual relations. If that were not so, then every 
violation of section 261.5 would also constitute rape under 
section 261, subdivision (a)(1). Of course, a minor might 
still be found incapable of giving legal consent to sexual 
intercourse in a particular case, but [the legislature] 
abrogate[ed] the rule that a girl under 18 is in all cases 
incapable of giving such legal consent . . . .153 
Whether or not the California Court accurately interpreted the 
legislature’s statutory reforms is beyond the scope of this 
article.154 This passage makes clear, however, that Doe’s 
“consent” to have sex with her supervisor may bar her sexual 
harassment and tort claims. 
Suppose for a moment that Starbucks Doe had been a New 
York teenaged barista rather than a California one. Arguably, Bee 
Line would have applied and a similar federal court would have 
been compelled to deny summary judgment even though Horton 
would have been convicted under New York criminal law. Why 
have a criminal statutory rape law if we think that older teenagers 
have the capacity to consent? More importantly, why do we think 
that a rule that anticipates that adolescents have adult-like capacity 
                                                          
152 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *7 (emphasis added) (quoting Tobias, 
21 P.3d at 761–62) (citations omitted) (comparing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b)–
(d) [offense classification and punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor], with CAL. PENAL CODE § 264(a) [punishment for rape])). 
153 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *7. 
154 For a thorough discussion of this case and the controlling California 
law, see Drobac, supra note 1. 
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is still appropriate given the new neuroscientific and psychosocial 
evidence and the adoption of that evidence by the United States 
Supreme Court? Starbucks and its east coast hypothetical give 
new meaning to “wake up and smell the coffee!” 
D. The Seventh Circuit and Doe v. Oberweis Dairy 
The civil law results in California and New York are not 
coastal aberrations. Other case law involving teen workers 
indicates that treatment of a minor’s consent in criminal cases is 
very different from how it is in civil cases. What explains this 
discrepancy? The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was one of 
the first to address the conflicts between criminal and civil laws in 
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy.155 
Starbucks Doe cited Oberweis in support of her contention 
that minors lack the capacity to consent to sex with adults. The 
Starbucks court found that Oberweis had “little persuasive 
effect” since it was a Seventh Circuit case that contradicted 
Tobias and did not consider California law. A closer look at 
Oberweis, however, may lead others to believe that it had more 
to offer in the Starbucks sexual harassment case than the 
Starbucks California federal district court determined. 
Like Starbucks, Oberweis was a sexual harassment case 
involving a sixteen-year-old teenager and her twenty-four-year-
old supervisor.156 Like New York, Illinois prohibits sex between 
minors under seventeen and adults.157 The Illinois federal district 
court in Oberweis found that the “unwelcomeness” requirement 
applies in employment cases involving minors and that the 
conduct about which Doe complained was not “unwelcome.”158 
                                                          
155 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006). 
156 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, No. 03 C 4774, 2005 WL 782709, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2005), rev’d, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006). 
157 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–15(c), 16 (2011) (defining criminal sexual 
abuse for victims under seventeen). 
158 Oberweis Dairy, 2005 WL 782709, at *6–7. The district court also 
found the conduct was not severe or pervasive, another requirement of the 
prima facie case. The court stated: 
Here, it is undisputed that through Plaintiff’s approximately eight-
month employment with Defendant, Nayman only touched Plaintiff 
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The court stated:  
It is undisputed that Plaintiff voluntarily visited 
Nayman’s [the supervisor’s] apartment alone the day of 
the encounter. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff asked 
Nayman to put a condom on [which he did not159] before 
they had sex. It is further undisputed that after the sexual 
encounter, Plaintiff voluntarily interacted with Nayman in 
social situations outside of the workplace. As such, no 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the 
sexual harassment was not unwelcome either in fact or 
law.160 
The district court clearly equated voluntariness or acquiescence 
with legal consent. Because Doe did not resist or otherwise 
indicate that the conduct was unwelcome, the court dismissed 
her sexual harassment case against Oberweis Dairy. 
The appellate court reversed.161 It found that while Nayman 
                                                          
on fifteen occasions. As detailed above, these touches included 
squeezing Plaintiff’s arm above her elbow, whereby Nayman would 
ask Plaintiff how she was doing, or giving Plaintiff non-sexual “side 
hugs.” Once, Nayman gave Plaintiff a hug and kiss in an effort to 
make Plaintiff happy; and another time, Nayman gave Plaintiff a 
“happy-to-see-you type of hug” when she came to work. Nayman 
also “playfully” hit Plaintiff on the behind with a rag on one 
occasion. On a few occasions, Nayman made allegedly harassing 
remarks towards Plaintiff, but it is undisputed that Plaintiff found 
these remarks “flattering.” Despite these allegedly harassing 
workplace events, Plaintiff continued to visit with Nayman socially 
outside of work, even after Plaintiff’s mother prohibited Plaintiff 
from visiting Nayman. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether the conduct which occurred at Plaintiff’s 
workplace was not severe or pervasive. 
Id. at *7. 
159 E-mail from H. Candace Gorman, Esq., Counsel for Doe, in 
Oberweis Dairy, to author (Apr. 29, 2010) (on file with the author). 
160 Oberweis Dairy, 2005 WL 782709, at *6. 
161 Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006). The appellate 
court described in much more detail how Nayman operated: 
Construing the evidence as favorably to her [Plaintiff] as the record 
permits, as we must, we assume that Nayman, the shift supervisor, 
regularly hit on the girls (most of the employees were teenage girls) 
and young women employed in the ice cream parlor. He would, as 
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had not committed forcible rape, he had committed “statutory 
rape,”162 “which is made a crime because of a belief that below 
a certain age a person cannot (more realistically, is unlikely to 
be able to) make a responsible decision about whether to have 
sex.”163 The Oberweis court emphasized the age disparity 
between Nayman and Doe. It explained, “In Illinois as 
elsewhere the crime is considered more serious the greater the 
disparity in ages between the parties. The theory is that a young 
girl (or boy) is likely to have particular difficulty resisting the 
blandishments of a much older man.”164 Note how this 
recognition of juvenile limitation resembles the incapacity 
defense enumerated in section 15 of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts, discussed above. 
Because of the belief that minors may not make responsible 
decisions about sex, the Oberweis court devised a plan for dealing 
with adolescent “consent” to sex under Title VII. The court held 
that litigants should look to the “age of consent” set under state 
law to determine whether the plaintiff’s “consent” will have legal 
significance under Title VII.165 The court explained: 
To avoid undermining valid state policy by reclassifying 
sex that the state deems nonconsensual as 
consensual . . . and to avoid intractable inquiries into 
maturity that legislatures invariably pretermit by basing 
entitlements to public benefits (right to vote, right to 
drive, right to drink, right to own a gun, etc.) on 
specified ages rather than on a standard of “maturity,” 
federal courts, rather than deciding whether a particular 
                                                          
one witness explained, “grope,” “kiss,” “grab butts,” “hug,” and 
give “tittie twisters” to these employees, including the plaintiff. 
These things he did in the store, but he would also invite the girls to 
his apartment. He had sexual intercourse in the apartment with two 
of them, one of them a minor, before it was the plaintiff’s turn. He 
was 25 when he had intercourse with her. 
Id. at 712–13. 
162 The court cited to the Illinois statutory rape law. 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/12-15(c), 16(d). 
163 Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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Title VII minor plaintiff was capable of “welcoming” the 
sexual advances of an older man, should defer to the 
judgment of average maturity in sexual matters that is 
reflected in the age of consent in the state in which the 
plaintiff is employed. That age of consent should thus be 
the rule of decision in Title VII cases.166 
In this passage, the Oberweis appellate court also referred to the 
need to avoid maturity evaluations. A serious problem with this 
plan becomes obvious immediately, though. Which system, 
criminal or civil, marks the age of consent? 
In California, a civil case interpreting Tobias, Donaldson v. 
Department of Real Estate,167 arguably gives us the answer. In 
Donaldson, the court considered whether the California 
Department of Real Estate had wrongfully revoked the real 
estate license of a twenty-four-year-old licensee who had 
seduced his sixteen-year-old sister-in-law. Donaldson had pled 
“no contest” to charges brought under Penal Code section 
261.5. When the California Real Estate Commissioner revoked 
his license, she interpreted his actions to be “[s]exually related 
conduct causing physical harm or emotional distress to 
a . . . non-consenting participant in the conduct.”168 In reversing 
the Commissioner, the Donaldson court held, “Just as there is 
no longer any “statutory rape” in this state, so there is no “age 
of consent” as concerns sexual relations, and references to such 
a concept can only muddy the analytical waters.”169 For states 
such as California, with no “age of consent,” adolescent 
“consent” garners legal significance, whether or not the minor 
has legal capacity in the criminal context. But what is the age of 
consent in New York? Is it determined by the criminal code or 
by the Bee Line cases which might necessarily lead to a maturity 
evaluation of the plaintiff? If the civil cases control, how will 
judges (or juries) conduct a maturity evaluation of a youth 
months or even years after the alleged conduct occurred? 
                                                          
166 Id. 
167 Donaldson v. Dep’t of Real Estate, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
168 Id. at 583 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2910(a)(5) (2011)). 
169 Id. at 589, 592. 
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The Oberweis appellate court acknowledged that its approach 
would necessarily mean that “the protection that Title VII gives 
teenage employees will not be uniform throughout the country, 
since the age of consent is different in different states, though 
within a fairly narrow band.”170 This federal appellate court 
clearly did not know in 2006, however, that only a few months 
earlier in California, the Donaldson state district court had 
declared the end of the “age of consent” in California civil 
cases. 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit court offered the nation a logical, 
if imperfect, formula for responding to adolescent “consent” in 
sexual harassment and sexual abuse cases. Conceivably, this 
standard produces different results in the case of the seduction of 
a sixteen-year-old Starbucks barista (or, for example, a Bee Line 
passenger) depending on where she lives. In Indiana, where the 
age of consent is sixteen, she loses her Title VII sexual 
harassment case.171 In Illinois and Wisconsin, where the ages of 
consent are seventeen and eighteen respectively,172 she may get 
beyond the summary judgment phase. Within the Seventh 
Circuit, Starbucks and other employers of teenagers navigate 
three different ages of consent. A random age demarcation alone 
does not make logical or legal sense. Moreover, this formula 
provides no clear guidance in states where criminal and civil law 
conflict in the way they treat adolescent non-resistance or 
“consent.” 
E. National Treatment of Adolescent “Consent” 
As noted earlier, the controversy involving the legal 
significance of adolescent “consent” exists across the nation. 
New York, California, and Illinois serve as just three examples 
of how different courts within those respective states treat 
                                                          
170 Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 714. 
171 IND. CODE § 35-42-4-9 (2011) (sexual misconduct with a minor, 
establishing the age of consent at sixteen). 
172 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.50 (2011) (criminal sexual abuse, 
establishing the age of consent at seventeen); WIS. STAT. § 948.09 (2011) 
(sexual intercourse with a child age sixteen or older, establishing the age of 
consent at sixteen). 
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adolescent non-resistance or acquiescence to sex. In 2004, I 
reviewed the conflicting laws across the United States and 
evaluated what kind of chance a sixteen-year-old, such as 
Starbucks Doe, might have in pursuing a sexual harassment or 
other related tort case. At that time, I concluded that the answer 
depended on where she consented and filed suit. The claims she 
brought would also influence the outcome. In the then twenty-
four states that set the age of consent at sixteen or lower, she 
had almost no chance for success under antidiscrimination law 
or tort law. That number increased to thirty-five if certain courts 
rejected or ignored the alleged special aggravating facts of her 
case.173 Those states would treat her as an adult and her consent 
would bar most claims. Even a successful statutory rape 
prosecution against the perpetrator might not assist her in states 
like Wisconsin, Tennessee, Louisiana, and California where 
civil legal precedent muddied the legal waters.174 
My 2004 analysis and summary review of developments in 
New York, California, and Illinois, highlight the inconsistencies 
and problems facing “consenting” minors across the United 
States. Now that California has rejected the proffered Oberweis 
plan in favor of the Tobias dicta, one can anticipate that more 
courts will grant summary judgment for employers like 
Starbucks against acquiescing or cooperative teenagers. So 
where does this discussion of legislative intent and case law 
interpretation leave us? Are the inconsistencies problematic and 
why do they persist? What can we say about the current state of 
the law in New York and California, as well as the prospects for 
the nation? 
1. Inconsistent Results 
Inconsistent treatments do not always lead to illogical results. 
For example, we can understand that a criminal jury might acquit 
O.J. Simpson of the murder of his wife and that a civil jury might 
find him liable.175 Those outcomes are inconsistent but they are not 
                                                          
173 Drobac, supra note 80, at 538–39. 
174 Id. at 539. 
175 I thank Martin Drobac, Esq. for exploring this thought with me. 
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illogical. The burden of proof for criminal conviction, proof 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” is much more rigorous than that for 
civil liability, proof by “a preponderance of the evidence.”176 The 
O.J. criminal trial jury apparently did not have enough evidence to 
convict on the higher standard. If the burdens are stricter in a 
criminal case, however, the adult respondent who engages in 
sexual intercourse with a teenager should be more likely to face 
liability in civil court. Since 2001, that outcome does not 
necessarily follow in California if the teenager “consented.” Now 
California’s criminal laws function much more restrictively than do 
the civil laws regarding the same episode. One wonders whether 
there is any other area of law in which civil liability attaches much 
less readily than criminal guilt. And, if not, one wonders why. 
2. Conflicts Stemming from Misguided Confusion 
One might suggest that this problem is a simple one of 
misguided interpretation and confusion. Starbucks relied on dicta 
from the Tobias California Supreme Court case that was arguably 
internally inconsistent in its treatment of sex crimes against minors. 
The Tobias Court was not reviewing Penal Code section 261.5 nor 
a civil sexual harassment claim. When it announced that minors 
might consent to sexual intercourse in 2001, the Tobias majority 
set California civil and criminal law completely at odds. Either the 
California legislature or the California Supreme Court can respond 
and ameliorate this resulting situation. However, ten years later, 
neither has moved to do so. As the precedent grows, scholars will 
find it less plausible to attribute the resulting conflicts between civil 
and criminal law to continuing confusion or misunderstanding.177 
                                                          
176 A jury acquitted O.J. Simpson of charges for the murder of his ex-
wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend Ronald Goldman. Following a 
civil trial for wrongful death and survival statute damages, the jury found 
Simpson liable by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rufo v. Simpson, 
103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (Ct. App. 2001) (affirming judgments in 
wrongful death and survival case brought by family members of Nicole 
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman against O.J. Simpson). This case 
highlights how differing criminal and civil law burdens can lead to seemingly 
contradictory results. 
177 For a fuller discussion of this issue regarding the age of consent, see 
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3. Teenagers on “Trial” 
The Starbucks case settled shortly before trial.178 However, 
had it not settled, Doe would have faced a trial of her maturity 
and “consent” under the “unwelcomeness” standard of the 
California FEPS. As a minor plaintiff, she would have been 
essentially “on trial” despite the fact that her adult consort was 
prosecuted under the applicable state sex crime law. 
How can one predict such a dire outcome in Starbucks? 
Compare Doe with Roe v. Orangeburg County School District.179 
In that case, a sixteen-year-old mentally handicapped student 
allegedly sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl after the 
coach left them alone in the school gym. The plaintiff, through 
her parents—since juveniles do not have capacity to sue in 
court—sued the school district and the coach.180 The Orangeburg 
court relied on Barnes v. Barnes,181 a challenge to the Indiana 
Rape Shield Statute.182 The Orangeburg court ruled to admit 
evidence of Doe’s “consent” and, quoting Barnes, reasoned: 
Unlike the victim in a criminal case, the plaintiff in a 
civil damage action is “on trial” in the sense that he or 
she is an actual party seeking affirmative relief from 
another party. Such plaintiff is a voluntary participant, 
with strong financial incentive to shape the evidence that 
determines the outcome. It is antithetical to principles of 
fair trial that one party may seek recovery from another 
based on evidence it selects while precluding opposing 
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice.183 
This passage highlights the court’s focus on fairness. The court 
ignored, however, that prejudice regularly justifies the exclusion 
                                                          
Drobac, supra note 1. 
178 E–mail from Lisa Bredahl, Court Clerk, to author (Aug. 24, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
179 Doe ex rel. Roe v. Orangeburg Cnty. Sch. Dist., 518 S.E.2d 259 
(S.C. 1999). 
180 Id. at 259. 
181 Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992). 
182 Id. at 1342. 
183 Orangeburg, 518 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Barnes, 603 N.E.2d at 
1342). 
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of probative evidence.184 Additionally, the court missed the point 
of exclusion. The main reason for excluding the consent was not 
the prejudice potentially created, but the minor’s incapacity that 
rendered the consent legally invalid. Moreover, it was not the 
minor who sued in this case but her adult guardian. This court 
did not even hesitate to put the consenting minor “on trial.” 
No matter what might have resulted had the Starbucks case 
gone to trial, other teenagers (and their prosecuting parents) 
should anticipate that defense lawyers will find the Starbucks 
summary judgment opinion and use it to defend sexual 
harassment and other civil rights and tort cases across the 
nation. Judges are already using this recent precedent outside of 
the employment context. For example, a new California Title IX 
case foreshadows future issues for teenagers in every 
jurisdiction. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
prohibits discrimination in educational institutions.185 In Doe v. 
Willits Unified School District,186 the magistrate judge ruled on a 
defense motion regarding discovery of the fifteen-year-old 
student’s sexual history, sexual conduct with her thirty-eight-
year-old teacher, and her “consent.” Following a sexual liaison 
with her teacher, Clint Smith, Doe had alleged a Title IX claim 
and various tort claims against him, the school district, and her 
principal. During Doe’s deposition, suspended because of 
discovery conflicts, defense counsel pursued questions 
concerning Doe’s sexual history and other topics. The court 
denied discovery regarding Doe’s sexual history187 but granted 
limited discovery regarding whether she “consented” to or 
“welcomed” Smith’s sexual overtures. 
In making its ruling, the Willits court acknowledged that 
other circuits had explored whether the “unwelcomeness 
requirement” is appropriately part of a prima facie case 
                                                          
184 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.”). 
185 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
186 Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-09-03655-JSW (DMR), 
2010 WL 2524587, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010). 
187 Id. at *3 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 412, which protects against 
admission of evidence regarding a plaintiff’s sexual history). 
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involving the sexual harassment of a minor at school. The court 
found: 
[C]ases outside the Ninth Circuit specifically have 
considered whether consent is an element of a Title IX 
case. Each of these cases has held that consent is not part 
of the cause of action. . . . The common theme of Mary 
M. and Chancellor is that consent or welcomeness should 
not be conflated with capacity to consent, and that where 
capacity is absent, any evidence of consent or 
welcomeness is irrelevant as a matter of law.188 
This analysis confirms that the court well understood the 
complexity of the issue. Here, we see the distinction between 
“voluntary and willing participation” noted in Chancellor, and 
capacity to consent, which can produce true, legally significant 
consent. In this Willits passage, the court seemed inclined to adopt 
the reasoning of sister courts regarding capacity to consent and 
adolescent “consent” to sex with an adult teacher. 
In footnote four following this passage, however, the Willits 
court explained that “California case law is unsettled on this 
point [regarding the relevance of ‘consent’].”189 The court cited 
both Tobias and Donaldson. The court then ruled on the 
discovery of Willits Doe’s “consent”: 
To the extent that cases squarely have addressed the question 
of whether “consent” or “welcomeness” is an element of a 
Title IX claim, the answer has been a resolute “no.” 
However, because the law in this circuit is unsettled, and 
because this Court does not wish to prematurely define the 
                                                          
188 Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The court cited the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning that a “thirteen-year-old student could not ‘welcome’ advances of 
twenty-one-year-old school employee; if ‘children cannot be said to consent 
to sex in a criminal context, they similarly cannot be said to welcome it in a 
civil context. To find otherwise would be incongruous.’” It also cited the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s holding that “notwithstanding [a] high 
school senior’s voluntary and willing participation in sexual relations with a 
teacher, the student cannot ‘welcome’ the teacher’s sexual advances if she 
lacks the capacity to consent.” Id. at *4 (quoting Mary M. v. N. Lawrence 
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1997); Chancellor v. Pottsgrove 
Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). 
189 Id. at *4 n.4. 
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elements of the causes of action in this case (a question more 
properly addressed by the trial judge), this Court will allow 
limited questions on the issue of whether plaintiff welcomed 
or consented to her sexual encounters with Smith.190 
This compromise and the footnote acknowledgement of the 
Tobias dicta, later adopted in Donaldson, virtually guaranteed 
that Willits Doe would face humiliating and perhaps traumatizing 
questions by defense counsel at her deposition’s resumption. 
In order to discredit Doe, defense counsel would have 
focused on whether Doe set limits with her thirty-eight-year-old 
teacher or welcomed his sexual overtures. If she failed to rebuff 
his advances or even encouraged them, defense counsel might 
have cast her as more “responsible.” She might have appeared, 
to those reading her deposition testimony, as more capable and 
legally accountable than one who resisted sexual advances by a 
teacher. Counsel could have posed deposition questions to 
portray Doe as more blameworthy if she “voluntarily” engaged 
in sexual conduct with her teacher. Ignoring the impact on 
Willits Doe, one can anticipate the chilling effects of this case on 
other teenagers who might report inappropriate sexual advances 
by teachers and on their parents who might consider prosecuting 
such cases on behalf of their teenagers. 
With the exception of Oberweis Dairy, these decisions 
arguably assume that the teenaged plaintiffs are fully “capable of 
appreciating the nature, extent or probable consequences of the 
conduct” and conforming their behavior in an adult-like fashion 
to meet the demands of a particular situation. They beg the 
question, however, of whether teenagers really do think and 
function like adults. An understanding of adolescent 
development informs any evaluation of whether teenagers are 
capable of making wise choices concerning sexual activity. 
Simply put, do teenagers have the capacity to opt for and cope 
with the repercussions of sex with a work supervisor such as 
Tim Horton, a teacher such as Clint Smith, a brother-in-law 
such as Robert Donaldson, or a Bee Line bus driver? 
                                                          
190 Id. at *5. 
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IV. CIVIL LAW’S TREATMENT OF “CONSENT” 
The neuroscience and psychosocial studies regarding 
adolescent development continue to influence our perceptions of 
adolescents as legal actors. Society can expect to hear 
impressive new revelations in the coming years. Our teenagers 
cannot wait, however, if waiting means a continuation of the 
legal status quo. Even if we cannot draw clear causal 
connections between neuroscience and behavior, we can evaluate 
whether the law is at least congruent with what we know about 
adolescent development. This Article suggests it is not and that, 
as a society, we can do better for our teenagers. The question 
remains: how do we adapt the law regarding adolescent consent 
to match their developmental capabilities and needs—at least 
until we know more? 
A. Create a National “Age of Consent” 
One proposal for dealing with adolescent “consent” involves 
nationally synchronizing the “age of consent” with the age of 
majority at eighteen.191 We might deny juvenile legal capacity 
until eighteen, even though we may agree that some minors 
demonstrate sufficient maturity to constitute legal capacity before 
that age. Several reasons support this move. First, it is more 
efficient to draw a bright line in a logical place. While we might 
disagree about where to draw the line, (at 16, 18, or 21), few 
will dispute that rules are easier to enforce than maturity 
evaluations are to conduct. 
Second, anything but a consistent bright line might lead to a 
maturity evaluation which puts a minor “on trial.” Anticipation 
of such a trial might cause many minors not to complain later 
about coercive and exploitative conduct to which they 
“consented” initially. Third, who knows how to do an effective 
                                                          
191 All states but four set the age of majority at eighteen. In Alabama and 
Nebraska, persons reach their majority at nineteen. In Pennsylvania and 
Mississippi, the age is twenty-one. Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, 
Minors and the Right To Consent to Health Care, GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. 
POL’Y, Aug. 2000, at 4, 7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
tgr/03/4/gr030404.pdf. 
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maturity evaluation? No such fool-proof test exists or every 
department of motor vehicles might use it before issuing a 
driver’s license to a teenager. As noted above, Graham 
confirmed that psychological evaluations to link behavior and 
maturity may not produce robust results. Additionally, who can 
say that a minor who is mature on the test date was mature on 
the day she “consented”? 
Fourth, many adults would rather err on the side of 
protecting all of our teenagers, even the relatively mature ones, 
than risk traumatizing or sacrificing the immature ones. The 
point of the law is to protect those persons who need the 
protection the most, not to sacrifice those youth because we are 
concerned about protecting a few who do not really need 
protection. However, a rule that eighteen marks the beginning of 
adulthood, such as most states have adopted, makes little sense 
given the neuroscience of late adolescent development. 
According to Dr. Ruben Gur, neuropsychologist and Director of 
the Brain Behavior Laboratory at the University of 
Pennsylvania: 
The evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease 
to mature until the early 20s in those relevant parts that 
govern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, 
foresight of consequences, and other characteristics that 
make people morally culpable. Therefore, a presumption 
arises that someone under 20 should be considered to 
have an underdeveloped brain. Additionally, since brain 
development in the relevant areas goes in phases that 
vary in rate and is usually not complete before the early 
to mid-20s, there is no way to state with any scientific 
reliability that an individual 17-year-old has a fully 
matured brain . . . . Indeed, age 21 or 22 would be 
closer to the “biological” age of maturity.192 
This passage highlights that bright line rules sometimes fail to 
track scientific advances. 
                                                          
192 Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D. at 15, Patterson v. Texas, 528 
U.S. 826 (1999) (No. 98-8907), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_ 
juvjus_Gur_affidavit.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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Therefore, I join opponents of bright line demarcations for 
the reservation of most rights because our children need 
maturing experiences. By setting the “age of consent” at a 
particular age, we deny younger teenagers many of the 
experiences that will lead to their neurological and psychosocial 
development. We also deny them important rights to which they 
are entitled and which they may need, such as the right to 
procreate, or not. If we infantilize them until they are eighteen, 
we may harm the very teenagers we would hope to protect. 
B. Eliminate the “Age of Consent” 
While one might craft a variety of solutions to address the 
concern that adolescent “consent” is different from adult 
consent, some responses seem patently irrational. The Tobias 
dicta which eliminates the age of consent in the context of civil 
liability creates more problems than it solves and appears 
inconsistent with what we know from the expert scientists 
regarding adolescent development and psychosocial maturity. 
This chapter’s brief review of conflicting laws and United States 
Supreme Court acceptance of the developmental differences 
between adults and teenagers suggests that the elimination of the 
“age of the consent” places teenagers at risk— of sexual 
predation, at least. 
C. Create New Multifactor Standards For Legal Consent 
Another approach involves a tripartite or multifaceted 
scheme.193 Society might use particular age requirements in 
certain contexts or for particular privileges, such as smoking or 
gaming, as the law does now. Where juveniles have less 
familiarity with the activity, where power imbalances exist, and 
where more serious consequences (than, for example, a financial 
loss on a lottery ticket) might result for a teenager, the law 
might set a higher age requirement tied to an objective criterion. 
Professor R. George Wright notes that a focus on the age of 
                                                          
193 I thank Professor R. George Wright for exploring this approach with 
me. 
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consent might simply be a distraction.194 He suggests that where 
no discernible disparity in power or subtle coercion complicates 
a relationship or situation, we might eliminate age 
requirements.195 
The risk of mandated maturity evaluations still poses a 
problem under this tripartite approach. As the Doe cases 
demonstrate, when jurists set fixed age barriers, judges make 
exceptions, sometimes to remain consistent with other legal 
doctrines. As noted, science does not yet provide definitive, 
comprehensive guidance on any given adolescent’s maturity, and 
evaluator bias can skew results of psychosocial evaluations. I 
worry that law makers will eliminate age of consent 
requirements to the detriment of youth, as I argue was done in 
Tobias. However, I agree that liability for Romeo and Juliet (or 
Romeo and Romeo) makes no sense and have suggested as much 
previously.196 
Not all adolescent “consent” requires formal legal analysis. 
When a six-year-old steals a kiss from a classmate, the child 
needs adult supervision and age-appropriate parenting guidance, 
not legal intervention.197 Arguably, Romeo and Juliet need 
similar and age-appropriate adult supervision and parenting 
guidance. By relying on responsible parenting and other 
informal strategies (such as peer counseling, mentoring by 
qualified youth leaders, teachers, and coaches), one can sidestep 
formal legal intervention to avoid the misplaced application of 
law regarding the “age of consent.” The wholesale elimination 
of these rules does more harm than good, however. In New 
York and across the nation, legal reform must remedy haphazard 
and misguided treatment of adolescent “consent” when power 
imbalances, adult-teen sexual predation, and more serious forms 
                                                          
194 See E-mail from Professor R. George Wright, Ind. Sch. of Law-
Indianapolis, to author (Apr. 30, 2010) (on file with author). 
195 Id. 
196 See Drobac, supra note 80, at 543 n.373. 
197 See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, Six Year Old’s Sex Crime: Innocent Peck 
on the Cheek, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/ 
09/27/us/6-year-old-s-sex-crime-innocent-peck-on-cheek.html?pagewanted= 
all&src=pm (reporting on a six-year-old boy who was charged with sexual 
harassment for kissing a classmate on the cheek). 
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of youth exploitation put adolescents at risk of injury and 
trauma. 
D. Legal Assent 
Rather than eliminate default guidance or attempt to 
implement myriad separate rules for the regulation of adolescent 
activities and “consent,” society might give adolescent 
“consent” legal significance when it is in a minor’s best interests 
to do so. To that end, I recommend a concept I call legal assent. 
Unlike medical assent, it requires no associated parental consent 
or permission. Unlike legal consent, it carries no associated 
threshold level of legal capacity. Similar to consent by a minor 
under contract law, legal assent is voidable by the minor. 
However, legal assent operates somewhat differently from 
traditional, voidable contract consent by a minor. If a minor 
gives legal assent, that “consent” is legally binding unless the 
minor voids her assent during her minority, or during a 
reasonable time thereafter. Parents cannot void a minor’s assent 
for her. If she successfully voids her assent, a court cannot even 
admit it into evidence or permit discovery on the matter. A 
criminal prosecutor might still prosecute an adult who has sex 
with an assenting minor, however, because the legal assent 
operates only for the benefit of the minor. Voters, legislators, 
and district attorneys might still act in society’s best interests. 
Additionally, parents still would have the authority to discipline 
their children—even in the context of an assent of which the 
parents disapproved. 
Consider an example. Suppose a minor, Doe, assents to sex 
with her teacher. The district attorney can prosecute him for 
statutory rape or, in California, unlawful sex with a minor. A 
successful case results in a vindication for a society that does not 
want its teachers having sex with students. If Doe reaffirms her 
assent, there is no parallel civil case; the legal controversy ends. 
Certainly, Doe’s parents can act domestically to comfort, guide, 
or discipline their daughter, as they see fit. 
If, on the other hand, Doe determines that she was duped, 
coerced, or made a mistake in assenting, she can void her legal 
assent and bring (through her guardian) a sexual harassment or 
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tort claim against her teacher to recover for her injuries. 
Arguably, sexual intercourse with an adult (teacher, supervisor, 
or bus driver) is not in her best interests. The court will affirm 
her revocation, deny any discovery, and exclude admission of 
evidence (at any phase of trial) regarding Doe’s assent if the 
adult raises it as a civil defense in a Title IX or tort case. 
Society allows Doe to void her assent and hopes that teachers 
will take warning and stay away from teenaged girls and boys. 
Criminal sanctions for adults clearly suggest that sexual 
activities with an adult are not in a minor’s best interests. 
Thus, Doe makes the first and second choices: whether to 
assent and whether to void her assent. Society permits her the 
second choice to protect her from the bad choices we anticipate 
she might make and to facilitate her own correction of her 
mistake. If an adult (such as Smith, Horton, Donaldson, or the 
Bee Line driver) challenges the abrogation, the court evaluation 
focuses not on the moral purity or maturity of the minor but 
upon whether the original assent was in her best interests. The 
evaluation focuses on the circumstances, not on the individual 
minor. 
Under this approach, all our Does, including South Carolina’s 
Orangeburg Doe, could have voided their assent. The 
Orangeburg court could not have allowed evidence of Doe’s 
assent at a subsequent civil trial unless it first determined that it 
was in fourteen-year-old Doe’s best interests to assent to sex with 
her sixteen-year-old classmate while the coach was gone. Absent 
that determination, the court would have had to validate Doe’s 
abrogation of assent and allowed Roe to pursue the case without 
the prejudice of Doe’s proffered “consent.” Similarly, in order to 
admit evidence of adolescent “consent,” a California court would 
have had to find that it was in Doe’s best interests to have sex 
with Donaldson, her older brother-in-law. An Illinois court would 
have had to conclude that it served Doe’s best interests to engage 
in sex with Nayman, the shift supervisor who was also seducing 
other teenaged workers. Aside from use in a “best interests” 
determination, this doctrine of legal assent would otherwise bar 
evidence of “consent” as too prejudicial and not sufficiently 
probative that an individual teenager necessarily understood the 
nature and consequences of the conduct at issue. 
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This theory of legal assent and its proposed use in sexual 
harassment or civil tort sex cases is consistent with what we 
know about adolescent development; teenagers need maturing 
experiences and the opportunity to practice their skills. They 
may not have the capacity to make every decision, but this 
approach permits teenagers to make some and avoid those that 
they later believe were unwise, foolish, or mistaken.198 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The existing conflicts between criminal and civil law 
treatment of adolescent “consent” leave teenagers vulnerable, 
especially to sexual predators. Court conflation of acquiescence, 
consent, and capacity highlights the need for legal reform and 
intervention. The new neuroscience evidence and studies 
concerning adolescent cognitive and psychosocial development 
confirm that adolescents are not the physical or functional 
equivalents of adults. Scientific studies that demonstrate that 
teenagers are developing capacity support the call for legal 
reform. Until we can assess adolescent maturity and capacity 
accurately, we need a way to protect teenagers while affording 
them some measure of legal autonomy and maturing 
experiences. 
An approach that credits legal assent by adolescents 
empowers teenagers to take responsibility for their choices. It 
also permits them to recover from poor choices by voiding their 
assent within a reasonable period of time.199 By showing how our 
criminal and civil laws conflict and fail to protect our maturing 
teenagers adequately, this Article has justified a response that 
includes the recognition and implementation of legal assent. 
                                                          
198 Legal assent makes sense for contexts in addition to those involving 
adolescent consent to sexual activity with an adult. Such situations are beyond 
the scope of this chapter, however, and will be explored in future academic 
papers. See, e.g., Drobac, supra note 1. 
199 I would advocate an appropriate limitations period for suit and 
recovery. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: 
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 782–83 (2000) 
(noting the tolling of the reporting time limitation under some statutory rape 
statutes until the victim reaches her majority). 
116 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Arguably, we must model the behavior that we wish to see from 
our older children. Therefore, we should reconsider our past 
legal decisions and implement a system, which corrects for 
obvious errors and inconsistencies, and which challenges, 
nurtures, and protects teenagers. Such a system includes the 
recognition of legal assent. Having explored a Bee Line in the 
wrong direction, this Article recommends a new path of reform 
and innovation, one congruent with the scientific evidence of 
adolescent development. 
 
